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Abstract—Network traffic inspection, including TLS traffic,
in enterprise environments is widely practiced. Reasons for
doing so are primarily related to improving enterprise security
(e.g., phishing and malicious traffic detection) and meeting legal
requirements (e.g., preventing unauthorized data leakage and
copyright violations). To analyze TLS-encrypted data, network
appliances implement a Man-in-the-Middle TLS proxy, by acting
as the intended web server to a requesting client (e.g., a browser),
and acting as the client to the actual/outside web server. As such,
the TLS proxy must implement both a TLS client and a server,
and handle a large amount of traffic, preferably, in real-time.
However, as protocol and implementation layer vulnerabilities in
TLS/HTTPS are quite frequent, these proxies must be, at least,
as secure as a modern, up-to-date web browser, and a properly
configured web server (e.g., an A+ rating in SSLlabs.com). As
opposed to client-end TLS proxies (e.g., as in several anti-virus
products), the proxies in network appliances may serve hundreds
to thousands of clients, and any vulnerability in their TLS
implementations can significantly downgrade enterprise security.
To analyze TLS security of network appliances, we develop
a comprehensive framework, by combining and extending tests
from existing work on client-end and network-based interception
studies. We analyze thirteen representative network appliances
over a period of more than a year (including versions before
and after notifying affected vendors, a total of 17 versions), and
uncover several security issues. For instance, we found that four
appliances perform no certificate validation at all, three use pre-
generated certificates, and eleven accept certificates signed using
MD5, exposing their clients to MITM attacks. Our goal is to
highlight the risks introduced by widely-used TLS proxies in
enterprise and government environments, potentially affecting
many systems hosting security, privacy, and financially sensitive
data.
Index Terms—TLS Interception, middleboxes/network appli-
ances, Man-in-the-Middle, server impersonation.
I. INTRODUCTION
MOST network appliances currently include an SSL/TLSinterception feature in their products. The interception
process is performed by making use of a TLS web proxy
server. Being either transparent or explicit to the end-user, the
proxy intercepts the user’s request to visit a TLS server, and
creates two separate TLS connections. It acts as the HTTPS
endpoint for the user’s browser, and as the client for the
actual HTTPS web server. Having the appropriate private key
for the signing certificate (inserted to the client’s root CA
store), the proxy has access to the raw plaintext traffic, and
can perform any desired action, such as restricting the access
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to the web page by parsing its content, or passing it to an
anti-virus/malware analysis module or a customized traffic
monitoring tool. Common reasons for adopting TLS inter-
ception include the protection of organization and individuals
against malware and phishing attacks, law enforcement and
surveillance, access control and web filtering, national security,
hacking and spying, and privacy and identity theft [41].
While interception violates the implicit end-to-end guaran-
tee of TLS, we focus on the potential vulnerabilities that such
feature introduces to end-users located behind the network
appliances, following several other existing studies on TLS
interception, e.g., [38], [19], [7], [33], [36]. In general, TLS
interception, even if implemented correctly, still increases the
attack surface on TLS due to the introduction of an additional
TLS client and server at the proxy. However, the lack of
consideration for following the current best practices on TLS
security as implemented in modern browsers and TLS servers,
may result in severe potential vulnerabilities, and overall, a
significantly weak TLS connection. For example, the proxy
may not mirror the TLS version and certificate parameters or
might accept outdated, insecure ones. Also, the proxy could
allow TLS compression, enabling the CRIME attack [35], or
insecure renegotiation [40]. The proxy may downgrade the
Extended Validation (EV) domains to Domain Validated (DV)
ones. It also may not mirror the cipher suites offered by the
requesting client, and use a hard-coded list with weak and
insecure ciphers, reviving old attacks such as FREAK [29],
Logjam [27], and BEAST [34]. If the proxy does not imple-
ment a proper certificate validation mechanism, invalid and
tampered certificates could be accepted by the proxy, and
the clients (as they see only proxy-issued, valid certificates).
Accepting its own root certificate as the signing authority of
externally delivered content could allow MITM attacks on the
network appliance itself. The use of a pre-generated key pair
by a proxy could enable a generic trivial MITM attack [33].
In addition, the proxy may rely on an outdated root CA store
for certificate validation, containing certificates with insecure
key length, expired certificates, or banned certificates that are
no longer trusted by major browsers/OS vendors.
Concerns about security weaknesses introduced by TLS in-
terception proxies are not new. In 2012, Jarmoc [38] proposed
a basic framework for testing network appliances consisting of
seven certificate validation tests, and applied it on four network
appliances. Dormann [19], [7] relied on badssl.com’s tests
to analyze the certificate validation process of two network
appliances, revealing flaws in the appliances’ certificate vali-
dation mechanisms. Carnavalet and Mannan [33] designed a
framework for analyzing client-based TLS proxies (as included
in several leading anti-virus and parental control applications),
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
08
72
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 S
ep
 20
18
2and revealed several flaws in the TLS version and certificate
mapping, certificate validation, private key generation and pro-
tection, CA trusted store content, in addition to vulnerabilities
to known TLS attacks. In 2017, Durumeric et al. [36] applied
tests from earlier frameworks on twelve network appliances
and thirteen client-side TLS proxies, uncovering several flaws
in certificate validation, cipher suites, TLS versions and known
TLS attacks.
We argue that most past studies on network appliances
analyzed only preliminary aspects of TLS interception, while
the extensive work of Carnavalet and Mannan [33] targeted
only client-end TLS proxies. However, TLS vulnerabilities
in network appliances could result in more serious security
issues, as arguably, enterprise computers handle more impor-
tant business/government data in bulk, compared to personal
information on a home user machine. Also, a single, flawed
enterprise TLS proxy can affect hundreds of business users,
as opposed to one or few users using a home computer with
a client-side TLS proxy.
We present an extensive framework dedicated for analyz-
ing TLS intercepting appliances, borrowing/adapting several
aspects of existing work on network appliances and client-end
proxies, in addition to applying a set of comprehensive cer-
tificate validation tests. We analyze the TLS-related behaviors
of appliance-based proxies, and their potential vulnerabilities
from several perspectives: TLS version and certificate param-
eter mapping, cipher suites, private key generation/protection,
content of root CA store, known TLS attacks, and 32 certifi-
cate validation tests. We use this framework to evaluate 13
representative TLS network appliances, a total of 17 product
versions, between July 2017 and March 2018 (see Table I),
including open source, free, low-end, and high-end network
appliances, and present the vulnerabilities and flaws found. All
our findings have been disclosed to the respective companies.
A summary of our findings include the following. Four
appliances do not perform any certificate validation by default,
allowing simple MITM attacks against their clients; one does
not perform certificate validation even after explicitly enabling
this feature in its configuration. Another appliance accepts self-
signed certificates, and three appliances use pre-generated key
pairs, enabling similar MITM attacks. One appliance states
in its documentation that it generates the key pair during
installation, but we found it to use a pre-generated key pair.
Four appliances accept their own certificates for externally
delivered content. Eleven appliances accept certificates signed
using the MD5 algorithm, and four appliances accept cer-
tificates signed using the MD4 algorithm. Eight appliances
offer weak and insecure ciphers (generally not offered by
any modern browser). Four appliances support SSL 3.0, of
which one only accepts TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 (i.e., rejects
connections with TLS 1.1 and 1.2). We also found that the
root CA stores of all appliances include at least one or more
certificates deemed untrusted by major browser/OS vendors,
and one appliance includes an RSA-512 certificate, which
can be trivially compromised. Nine appliances also do not
encrypt their private keys; seven such keys are accessible to
unprivileged processes running on the same appliance.
Analyzing network appliances raises several new challenges
compared to testing browsers and client-end TLS proxies.
Several network appliances do not include an interface for
importing custom certificates (essential for testing), and many
appliances do not provide access to the file system or a ter-
minal, overburdening the tasks of injecting custom certificates
and locating the private keys (for details, see [46, Appendix
B]). Many appliances do not support more than one or two
network interfaces, and thus, require the use of a router to
connect to multiple interfaces. In addition, appliances that
perform SSL certificate caching require the generation of a
new root key pair for their TLS proxies for each test.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) We
develop a comprehensive framework to analyze TLS inter-
ception in enterprise-grade network appliances, combining
our own certificate validation tests with existing tests for
TLS proxies (both client-end services and network appli-
ances), which we reuse or adapt as necessary for our pur-
pose. Our certificate validation tests can be found at: https://
madiba.encs.concordia.ca/software/tls-netapp/. (2) We use this
framework to evaluate thirteen well-known appliances from
all tiers: open source, free, low-end, and high-end products,
indicating that the proposed framework can be applied to
different types of network appliances. (3) We uncover several
vulnerabilities and bad practices in the analyzed appliances,
including: either an incomplete or completely absent certificate
validation process (resulting trivial MITM attacks), improper
use of TLS parameters that mislead clients, inadequate private
key protection, and the use of weak/insecure cipher suites.
Differences with the ACM ASIACCS version [46]. We
make the following significant changes to the current article.
We analyze seven new appliances using our framework (in
addition to the six appliances in [46]); the updated results
are discussed in Section V. In total, we report the results of
seventeen different versions of thirteen products we analyzed.
We uncover a new dangerous vulnerability that was not seen
with the previously tested appliances; three of the newly tested
appliances use pre-generated root key pairs. This can lead
to trivial full server impersonation attacks; we discuss the
implications of this vulnerability in Section VII. We also
reanalyze the latest up-to-date releases of the six previously
analyzed appliances, present the new results in Section V, and
discuss the differences between the findings of the previously
tested releases and the new ones in Section VI. Note that
we shared our findings with the affected product vendors
before our initial publication, and tested the versions that some
vendors claimed to have fixed the reported vulnerabilities. We
also make a few modifications to our original test framework
(Section IV): we improve the key/certificate extraction from
the appliances (Section IV-B); we introduce a new method
for locating private keys (Section IV-H) in some appliances
using the ‘squid.conf’ file, and brute-forcing the passphrase of
the encrypted private key in one appliance using a password
cracker tool; and we enumerate the list of TCP ports that need
to be intercepted to successfully utilize the Qualys client test
and badssl.com (Section IV-A).
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LIST OF THE TESTED APPLIANCES; WE USE THE TEXT IN BOLD TO REFER
TO THE APPLIANCES THROUGHOUT THIS PAPER. WE ONLY DISCUSS THE
RESULTS OF THE LATEST RELEASES (“VERSIONS” IN BOLD).
Appliance Company Version
Untangle NG Firewall Untangle 13.0
13.2
pfSense NetGate 2.3.4
2.4.2-P1
WebTitan Gateway TitanHQ 5.15 build 794
5.16 build 1602
Microsoft TMG Microsoft 2010 SP2 rollup update 5
UserGate Web Filter Entensys 4.4.3320601
Cisco Ironport WSA Cisco AsyncOS 10.5.1 build 270
AsyncOS 10.5.1 build 296
Sophos UTM Sophos 9.506-2
TrendMicro Interscan WSVA TrendMicro 6.5 SP2 build 1765
McAfee Web Gateway McAfee 7.7.2.8.0 build 25114
Cacheguard Web Gateway v1.3.5 Cacheguard 1.3.5
OpenSense Deciso B.V. 18.1.2 2
Comodo Dome Firewall Comodo 2.3.0
Endian Firewall Community Endian 3.2.4
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the TLS interception process,
list the tested products, state the expected behavior of a TLS
proxy, and explain the threat model.
Terminology. Throughout the paper, we refer to the TLS
intercepting network appliances as proxies, HTTPS proxies,
TLS proxies, middleboxes, or simply appliances. For the TLS
requesting client, we use: browser, end-user, user, or client.
The term mirroring is used to describe a situation where the
proxy sends the same TLS parameters received from the web
server to the client side, and vice versa; otherwise, mapping is
used to indicate that the proxy has modified some parameters
(for better or worse). We refer to the trusted root CA stores as
stores, trusted stores or trusted CA stores. We refer to virtual
machines as virtual appliances, VMs, or simply machines.
A. Proxies and TLS Interception
For TLS interception, network appliances make use of TLS
proxies, deployed as either transparent proxies or explicit
proxies. The explicit proxy requires the client machine or
browser to have the proxy’s IP address and listening port
specifically configured to operate. Thus, the client is aware
of the interception process, as the requests are sent to the
proxy’s socket. On the other hand, transparent proxies may
operate without the explicit awareness of the clients, as they
intercept outgoing requests that are meant for the web servers,
without the use of an explicit proxy configuration on the client
side; however, for TLS interception, a proxy’s certificate must
be added to the client’s trusted root CA store (explicitly by
the end-user, or pre-configured by an administrator). Such
proxies could filter all ports, or a specific set of ports, typically
including HTTP port 80 and HTTPS port 443. Secure email
protocols could also be intercepted, by filtering port 465
for secure SMTP, port 993 for secure IMAP, and port 995
for secure POP3. The proxy handles the client’s outgoing
request by acting as the TLS connection’s endpoint, and
simultaneously initiates a new TLS connection to the actual
web server by acting as the client, while relaying the two
connections’ requests and responses.
By design, the TLS protocol should prevent any MITM
interception attempt, by enforcing a certificate validation pro-
cess, which mandates that the incoming server certificate must
be signed by a trusted issuer. Certificate authorities only
provide server certificates to validated domains, and not to
forwarding proxies, precluding the proxy from becoming a
trusted issuer (i.e., a valid local CA). To bypass this restriction,
the proxy can use a self-signed certificate that is added to the
trusted root CA store of the TLS client, and thereby allowing
the proxy to sign certificates for any domain on-the-fly, and
avoid triggering browser warnings that may expose the un-
trusted status of the proxy’s certificate. Thereafter, all HTTPS
pages at the client will be protected by the proxy’s certificate,
instead of the intended external web server’s certificate. Users
are not usually aware of the interception process, unless they
manually check the server certificate’s issuer chain, and notice
that the issuer is a local CA [39].
B. Tested Appliances
Most current network appliance vendors offer products for
TLS interception. We select thirteen products, including: free
appliances, appliances typically deployed by small companies,
appliances with affordable licensing for small to medium sized
businesses, and high-end products for large enterprises; see
Table I. On a side note, we performed several rounds of
updates and patches for Microsoft, on a Windows Server
2008 R2 operating system, as recommended by Microsoft’s
documentation [14]. These include the service pack 1 (SP1),
the service pack 1 update, the service pack 2, and five rollup
updates (1 to 5) [13].
For all the analyzed appliances, we keep the default con-
figuration for their respective TLS proxies. An administrator
could of course manually modify this default configuration,
which may improve or degrade the proxy’s TLS security. We
thus choose to apply our test framework on the unmodified
configuration (assuming the vendors will use secure-defaults).
C. Expected Behavior of a TLS Proxy
We summarize expected behaviors from a prudent intercep-
tion proxy (following [33]). Deviations from these behaviors
help design and refine our framework and validation tests.
The TLS version, key length, and signature algorithms
should be mirrored (between client-proxy and proxy-web) to
avoid misleading clients regarding the TLS security parameters
used in the proxy-web connection. The client’s cipher suites
also should be mirrored, or at least the proxy must not offer
any weak ciphers. The proxy must be patched against known
TLS attacks, e.g., BEAST [34], CRIME [35], FREAK [29],
Logjam [27], and TLS insecure renegotiation [40].
TLS proxies must properly validate external certificates, as
the client software (e.g., browsers) will be only exposed to
the proxy-issued certificates. Thus, all aspects of TLS chain
of trust should be properly validated, and common flaws must
be avoided, e.g., untrusted issuers, mismatched signatures,
wrong common-names, constrained issuers, revoked/expired
certificates, and deprecated signature algorithms. The proxy’s
trusted CA store must avoid short key, expired or untrusted
4issuer certificates. TLS proxies must also disallow any external
certificates signed by their own root keys. Proxies’ private keys
must be adequately protected (e.g., limiting access to the root
account), and the keys must not be pre-generated (cf. [11]).
D. Threat Model
We mainly consider three types of attackers.
An external attacker can impersonate any web server by
performing a MITM attack on a network appliance that does
not perform a proper certificate validation. The attacker could
be anywhere on the network between the appliance and the
target website. Even if the validation process is perfect, the
attacker could still impersonate any web server, if the appli-
ance uses a pre-generated root certificate or accepts external
site-certificates signed by its own root key. The attacker could
also take advantage of known TLS attacks/vulnerabilities to
potentially acquire authentication cookies (BEAST, CRIME),
or impersonate web servers (FREAK, Logjam).
A local attacker (e.g., a malicious insider, external attacker
with access to a compromised machine in the local network)
with a network sniffer in promiscuous mode can get access
to the raw traffic from the connections between the network
appliance and clients. If the appliance uses a pre-generated
certificate, the malicious user can install her own instance of
the appliance, acquire its private key, and use it to decrypt the
sniffed local traffic when the TLS connections are not pro-
tected by forward-secure ciphers. Such an adversary can also
impersonate the proxy itself to other client machines, although
this may be easily discovered by network administrators.
An attacker who compromises the network appliance itself
with non-root privileges can acquire the private key if the
key is not properly protected (e.g., read access to ‘other’
users and no passphrase encryption). With elevated privileges,
more powerful attacks can be performed (e.g., beyond access-
ing/modifying TLS traffic). We do not consider such privi-
leged attackers, assuming having root access on the appliance
would be much more difficult than compromising other low-
privileged accounts. Note that, in most cases, the appliance
is simply an ordinary Linux/Windows box with specialized
software/kernel, resulting in a large trusted code base (TCB).
III. RELATED WORK
Several studies have been recently conducted on TLS inter-
ception, TLS certificate validation, and forged TLS certificates.
The most closely related work is by Durumeric et al. [36]
(other studies mostly involved analyzing TLS libraries and
client-end proxies; see [46]). While their work focuses pri-
marily on fingerprinting TLS interception, in addition to a
brief security measurement for several HTTPS proxies, we
develop an extensive framework dedicated for analyzing the
TLS interception on network appliances. They checked/rated
the highest TLS version supported by a target proxy, while
we examine all the supported versions by the proxy, in addi-
tion to their respective mapping/mirroring to the client side.
Durumeric et al.’s certificate validation tests include: expired,
self-signed, invalidly signed certificates, and certificates signed
by CAs with known private keys; we include more tests for this
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important aspect (a total of 32 distinct tests). We also include
several new tests such as: checking the content of the CA
trusted store and the certificate parameter mapping, locating
the private keys of the proxies and examining their security
(including checking pre-generated root certificates); these tests
are mostly added/extended from [33], [32]. In terms of results,
for the five products overlapping with Durumeric et al. [36],
we observed a few differences; see Section VI.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the setup/architecture of the
proposed framework, and its major components and tests.
A. Test Setup/Architecture
Our framework consists of three virtual machines: a client,
a web server, and the TLS intercepting network appliance;
see Figure 1. The client machine (Windows 7 SP1) is located
behind the appliance; we update the client with all available
Windows updates, and install up-to-date Mozilla Firefox,
Google Chrome, and Internet Explorer 11 on it. We insert
the TLS proxy’s root certificate into the client’s trusted CA
stores (both Windows and Mozilla stores). We use a browser
to initiate HTTPS requests to our local Apache web server,
and the online TLS security testing suites (for certain tests).
These requests are intercepted by the tested TLS proxy.
The second machine hosts a web server (Apache/Ubuntu
16.04), and accepts HTTP and HTTPS requests (on ports
80 and 443, respectively); all port 80 requests are redirected
to port 443. It is initially configured to accept all TLS/SSL
protocol versions, and all available cipher suites. The server
name is configured to be apache.host, as the crafted certificates
must hold a domain name (not an IP address). We generate the
faulty certificates using OpenSSL, which are served from the
web server. It also hosts the patched howsmyssl.com code [10].
The pre-installed OpenSSL version on the Ubuntu 16.04
distribution is not compiled with SSLv3 support. Thus, in
order to test the acceptance and mapping of SSLv3 only,
we rely on an identically configured older version of Ubuntu
(14.04), with an older OpenSSL version that supports SSLv3.
The third machine hosts the appliance that we want to test.
The appliances are typically available as a trial version on a
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vendor’s website, with a pre-configured OS, either as an ISO
image or an Open Virtualization Format file. The appliances
are configured to intercept TLS traffic either as a transparent
or explicit proxy, depending on the available modules. If both
are available, transparent proxies are prioritized, as they do
not require any client-side network configuration. We disable
services such as firewall and URL filtering, if bundled in
the appliances, to avoid any potential interferences in our
TLS analysis. The root CA certificates corresponding to our
faulty test certificates are injected into the trusted stores of the
appliances. We include the following TCP ports to the list of
intercepted ports, as they are used by the Qualys client test and
badssl.com: 1010, 1011, 10200, 10300, 10301, 10302, 10303,
10444, and 10445 (determined by analyzing traffic captures
on Wireshark of TLS connections to Qualys/badssl websites).
Some appliances offer an interface to add custom ports to be
intercepted by the TLS proxy, while others require manual
configuration in their configuration files.
We set up a local DNS entry for apache.host on the client,
web servers and network appliances machines. Operating sys-
tems match local DNS entries, found typically in the hosts file,
before remote DNS entries, resulting in the correct mapping of
our test server’s domain name to its corresponding IP address.
We require three different interfaces on each virtual network
appliance. The Client Interface is used to connect to the
Windows 7 client. The traffic incoming from this interface
is intercepted by the TLS proxy. Transparent proxies only
require the appliance to be the default gateway for the client,
while explicit proxies require the client to configure the proxy
settings with the appliance’s socket details. The Server Inter-
face is used to connect to the Apache web server. The WAN
Interface connects to the Internet, through Network Address
Translation (NAT). However, some appliances support one or
two interfaces. In such cases, we add a fourth virtual machine,
that acts solely as a router with multiple interfaces. We use
pfSense as the router (without TLS interception), relying on
it for NATting and routing traffic of the three interfaces as
required; see Figure 2. The client and the network appliance
are connected to the Client Interface, the web server is
connected to the Server Interface, and the Internet connectivity
is provided through NAT on a third interface via pfSense. A
local DNS entry for apache.host is also added to this router.
B. Trusted CA Store
We first locate the trusted store of the TLS proxy, to inject
our root certificates in it, required for most of our tests.
Injecting custom certificates into a trusted store could be
trivial, if the appliance directly allows adding custom root CAs
(e.g., via its user interface). If no such interface is offered,
we attempt to get a command line (shell) access through a
terminal, or, the SSH service if available, by enabling the
SSH server first through the settings panels (we transfer files
using the SCP/SFTP protocols). If SSH is unavailable, we
mount the virtual disk image of the appliance on a separate
Linux machine. When mounting, we perform several attempts
to find the correct filesystem type and subtype used by
the appliance (undocumented). After a successful mount, we
search the entire filesystem for digital certificates in known
formats, such as “.crt”, “.pem”, “.cer”, “.der”, and “.key”. We
thus locate several directories with candidate certificates, and
subsequently delete the content of each file, while trying to
access regular websites from the client. When an “untrusted
issuer” warning appears at the client, we then learn the exact
location/directory of the trusted store (and can eliminate du-
plicate/unnecessary certificates found in multiple directories).
We then inject our custom crafted root certificates into the
trusted CA stores. We also parse the certificates available in the
trusted stores to identify any expired certificates, or certificates
with short key lengths (e.g., RSA-512 and RSA-1024). We also
check for the presence of root CA certificates from issuers that
are no longer trusted by major browser/OS vendors. Our list
of misbehaving CAs includes: China Internet Network Infor-
mation Center (CNNIC [5]), TU¨RKTRUST [22], ANSSI [18],
WoSign [6], Smartcom [6], and Diginotar [4].
C. TLS Version Mapping
To test the SSL/TLS version acceptance and TLS parameter
mapping/mirroring, we alter the Apache web server’s config-
uration. We use a valid certificate whose root CA certificate
is imported into the trusted stores of the client (to avoid
warnings and errors). We then subsequently force one TLS
version after another at the web server, and visit the web server
from the client, while documenting the versions observed
in the browser’s HTTPS connection information. Using this
methodology, we are able to analyze the behavior of a proxy
regarding each SSL/TLS version: if a given version is blocked,
allowed, or altered in the client-to-proxy HTTPS connection.
D. Certificate Parameters Mapping
We check if the proxy-to-server certificate parameters are
mapped or mirrored to the client-to-proxy certificate parame-
ters. The parameters studied are signature hashing algorithms,
certificate key lengths, and the EV/DV status.
For testing signature hashing algorithms, we craft multiple
valid certificates with different secure hash algorithms, such
as SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. We import their root
CA certificates into the trusted stores of the client to avoid
warnings and errors. We subsequently load each certificate
and its private key into the web server, and visit the web page
from the browser. We track the signature algorithms used in the
6certificates generated by the TLS proxy for each connection,
and learn if the proxy mirrors the signature hashing algorithms,
or use a single hard-coded one.
For testing certificate key lengths, we craft multiple cer-
tificates with multiple acceptable key sizes: RSA-2048, RSA-
3072 and RSA-4096. We import their correspondent root CA
certificates into the trusted stores of the client. We subse-
quently load each certificate and its private key into the web
server, and visit the web page from the browser. We check
the key length used for the client-to-proxy server certificate
generated by the proxy for each connection, and learn if the
proxy mirrors the key-length, or uses a hard-coded length.
We rely on Twitter’s website to study the network appli-
ance’s behavior regarding EV certificates. We visit twitter.com
on the client machine, and check the client-to-proxy certifi-
cate displayed by the browser. TLS proxies can identify the
presence of EV certificates (e.g., to avoid downgrading them
to DV), by parsing the content and locating the CA/browser
forum’s EV OID: 2.23.140.1.1 [8].
E. Cipher Suites
Cipher suites offered by the TLS proxy in the proxy-to-
server TLS connection can be examined in multiple ways.
We initially rely on publicly hosted TLS testing suites,
howsmyssl.com and the Qualys client test [21]. Since the con-
nection is proxied, the displayed results found on the client’s
browser are the results of the proxy-to-server connection, and
not the client-to-proxy connection. If the mentioned web pages
are not filtered, for reasons such as the use unfiltered or non-
standard ports, we use Wireshark to capture the TLS packets
and inspect the Client Hello message initiated by the proxy to
locate the list of ciphers offered.
We then compare the list of ciphers offered by the proxy to
that list of our browsers, deduce if the TLS proxy performs
a cipher suite mirroring or uses a hard-coded list. We also
parse the proxy’s cipher-suite for weak and insecure ciphers
that could lead to insecure and vulnerable TLS connections.
F. Known TLS Attacks
We test TLS proxies for vulnerabilities against well-known
TLS attacks, including: BEAST, CRIME, FREAK, Logjam,
and Insecure Renegotiation. We rely on the Qualys SSL Client
Test [21] to confirm if the TLS proxy is patched against
FREAK, Logjam, and Insecure Renegotiation, and check if
TLS compression is enabled for possible CRIME attacks. We
visit the web page from the client browser, which displays
the results for the proxy-to-server TLS connection. For the
BEAST attack, we rely on howsmyssl.com [10] (with the
modifications from [33]) to test the proxies that support TLS
1.2 and 1.1. For a system to be vulnerable to BEAST [34],
it must support TLS 1.0, and use the CBC mode. However,
after the BEAST attack was uncovered, a patch was released
for CBC (implementing the 1/(n−1) split patch [1]), but was
identically named as CBC, making the distinction between the
patched/unpatched CBC difficult.
G. Crafting Faulty Certificates
We use OpenSSL to craft our invalid test certificates,
specifying apache.host as the Common Name (CN), except
for the wrong CN test. We then deploy each certificate on
our Apache web server, and request the HTTPS web page
from the proxied client, and thus learn how the TLS proxy
behaves when exposed to faulty certificates; if a connection
is allowed, we consider the proxy is at fault. If the proxy
replaces the faulty certificate with a valid one (generated by
itself), leaving no way even for a prudent client (e.g., an up-
to-date browser) to detect the faulty remote certificate, we
consider this as a serious vulnerability. If the proxy passes
the unmodified certificate and relies on client applications to
react appropriately (e.g., showing warning/error messages, or
terminating the connection), we still consider the proxy to be
at fault for two reasons: (a) we do not see any justification
for allowing plain, invalid certificates by any TLS agent, and
(b) not all TLS client applications are as up-to-date as modern
browsers, and thus may fail to detect the faulty certificates.
When the certificate’s chain of trust contain intermediate
certificate(s), we place the leaf certificate and intermediate
certificate(s) at the web server, by appending the intermediate
certificate(s) public keys after the server leaf certificate, in
SSLCertificateFile. Note that we inject the issuing CA certifi-
cates of the crafted certificates into the TLS proxy’s trusted
store for all tests, except for the unknown issuer test and the
fake GeoTrust test.
We compile the list of faulty certificates using several
sources (including [33], [32], [37]; see [46]) for details).
Before using the faulty certificates, we assess them against
Firefox v53.0 (latest at the time of testing), and confirm that
Firefox terminates all connections with these certificates.
As part of the analysis of the certificate validation mech-
anisms, we ensure that the TLS proxies do not cache TLS
certificates, by checking the ‘Organization Name’ field of
the subject parameter in the server certificates. Each leaf
certificate of the crafted chains contains a unique ‘Organization
Name’ value, allowing us to identify exactly which TLS
certificate is being proxied. We additionally check if the TLS
inspection feature is enabled by default after the activation of
the appliances, or if it requires a manual activation.
H. Private Key Protection, Self-issued, and Pre-Generated
Certificates
We attempt to locate a TLS proxy’s private key (corre-
sponding to its root certificate), and learn if it is protected
adequately, e.g., inaccessible to non-root processes, encrypted
under an admin password. Subsequently, we use the located
private keys to sign leaf certificates, and check if the TLS
proxy accepts its own certificates as the issuing authority for
externally delivered content.
To locate the private keys on the non-Windows systems,
access to the network appliances’ disks content and their
filesystems is required. If we get access to an appliance’s
filesystem (following Section IV-B), we search for files with
the following known private key file extensions: “.pem”,
“.key”, “.pfx”, and “.p12”, and then compare the modulus of
7TABLE II
RESULTS FOR TLS PARAMETER MAPPING/MIRRORING AND VULNERABILITIES TO KNOWN ATTACKS. FOR TLS VERSION MAPPING, WE DISPLAY THE
TLS VERSIONS SEEN BY THE CLIENT WHEN THE WEB SERVER USES TLS 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 AND SSL 3.0 (‘–’ MEANS UNSUPPORTED. ‘†’ MEANS SUPPORTED
BUT TERMINATE WITH A HANDSHAKE FAILURE; SEE SECTION V-A). UNDER “KEY LENGTH MAPPING”: ‘*’ MEANS THE APPLIANCE MIRRORS RSA-512
AND RSA-1024 KEY SIZES, BUT USE A STATIC KEY SIZE RSA-2048 FOR ANY HIGHER KEY SIZES (SEE SECTION V-A). UNDER “PROBLEMATIC
CIPHERS”: WEAK MEANS DEPRECATED; INSECURE MEANS BROKEN; BLANK MEANS GOOD CIPHERS. UNDER “BEAST”: 7 MEANS VULNERABLE; 7*
MEANS POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE (UNKNOWN IF CBC IS PATCHED WITH 1/(n− 1) SPLIT); BLANK MEANS PATCHED. ALL THE APPLIANCES ARE
PATCHED AGAINST FREAK, LOGJAM, CRIME, AND INSECURE RENEGOTIATION.
TLS Version Mapping Cipher Suites Certificate Parameter Mapping
TLS
1.2
TLS
1.1
TLS
1.0
SSL
3.0
Cipher
Suites
Mirroring
Problematic
Ciphers/Hash Algorithms
Key
Length
Mapping
Signature
Algorithm
Mapping
EV
Certi-
ficates
BEAST
Untangle 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 3DES 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
pfSense 1.2 – – – 7 2048 SHA256 DV
WebTitan 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 7 3DES, RC4, IDEA 1024 SHA256 DV 7*
Microsoft – – 1.0 3.0 7 3DES, DES, RC4, MD5 2048 Mirrored DV 7
UserGate 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 3DES, DES 1024 SHA256 DV 7*
Cisco 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 2048* SHA256 DV 7
Sophos 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
TrendMicro 1.2 † † – 7 3DES, RC4 1024 SHA256 DV 7
McAfee 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 2048 SHA256 DV
Cacheguard 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 7 3DES 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
OpenSense 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 3 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
Comodo 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 7 3DES, RC4, IDEA 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
Endian 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 7 3DES, RC4, IDEA 2048 SHA256 DV 7*
located RSA private keys with the proxy’s public key cer-
tificate to locate the correct corresponding key. Alternatively,
we locate the ‘squid.conf’ file, the configuration file of the
Squid [20] proxy, used by most appliances as the proxy API.
Squid is an open source proxy, that performs TLS interception
through its ‘ssl bump’ option. The configuration file points
to the full path of the private key, and thus, leads us to the
location of the RSA key. If the filesystem is inaccessible, we
parse the raw disks for keys, using the Linux command strings
on the virtual hard disk file and search for private keys. We
also use memory analysis tools, such as Volatility [25] and
Heartleech [9], to extract the private keys in some cases; for
more information, see [46, Appendix B]. If we acquire the
private key using this methodology, we still get no information
on the key’s location within the appliance’s file system, storage
method (e.g. encrypted, obfuscated), and privileges required
to access the key. For Windows-based appliances, we utilize
Mimikatz [16] to extract the private key (cf. [33]). Key storage
is usually handled on Windows using two APIs: Cryptog-
raphy API (CAPI), or Cryptography API: Next Generation
(CNG [26]). When executed with Administrator privileges,
Mimikatz exports private keys that are stored using CAPI and
CNG. We check the location of the private keys, the privilege
required to access them and if any encryption or obfuscation
is applied. If the located private key on disk is encrypted, we
rely on a python script to launch a dictionary attack.
We also check if appliance vendors rely on pre-generated
certificates for their proxies, which could be very damaging.
We install two instances of the same product, and compare
the certificates along with their correspondent private keys
(if located). If we find the same key, we conclude that the
appliance uses a pre-generated certificate, instead of per-
installation keys/certificates.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we detail the results of our analysis on TLS
parameters, certificate validation, trusted certificate stores, and
private key protection.
A. TLS Parameters
Table II shows an overview of our results.
TLS versions and mapping. Ten appliances support TLS
versions 1.2, 1.1, and 1.0, among which three also support SSL
3.0. pfSense supports TLS 1.2 only (restricting access to some
sites). Microsoft supports only TLS 1.0 and (more worryingly)
SSLv3; as many web servers nowadays do not support these
versions (specifically SSLv3), clients behind Microsoft will be
unable to visit these websites (Over 25% of web servers do
not support TLS 1.1 & TLS 1.2. [12]).
TrendMicro terminates the TLS connections if the highest
TLS version supported by the client is not supported by the
requested server, instead of using a lower TLS version that
is supported by both the client and the server. For example,
if the requesting client supports TLS versions 1.2, 1.1 and
1.0, and the requested server supports TLS 1.1 and 1.0 only,
TrendMicro terminates the connection (with a handshake fail-
ure) instead of establishing it with the TLS version 1.1. This
behavior is a more restrictive form of TLS version mirroring.
Except Microsoft and TrendMicro, other appliances map all
the proxy-to-server TLS versions to TLS 1.2 for the client-
to-proxy connection, and thus mislead browsers/users through
this artificial version upgrade.
Certificate parameters and mapping. No appliance, except
Cisco, mirrors the RSA key sizes; instead, they use a hard-
coded key length for all generated certificates (i.e., artificially
upgrade/downgrade the external key-length to RSA-2048, and
thus may mislead clients/users). When exposed to RSA-512
8and RSA-1024 server certificates, Cisco mirrors those key
lengths to client-to-proxy TLS connection. However, when
exposed to RSA-2048, RSA-4096 and RSA-8196, Cisco maps
those key lengths to a static RSA-2048 key size for the client-
to-proxy TLS connection. Three appliances use the currently
non-recommended RSA-1024 certificates [28]. Microsoft is
the only appliance which mirrors the hash algorithm; the re-
maining appliances use SHA256, thus making external SHA1-
based certificates (considered insecure) invisible to browsers.
All appliances intercept TLS connections with EV certifi-
cates, and thus, inevitably downgrade any EV certificate to
DV (as the proxies cannot generate EV certificates).
Cipher suites. We use the Qualys Client Test [21] to determine
the list of cipher suites used by the TLS proxies. Only
OpenSense mirrors the client’s cipher suites to the server
side. Each of our test client’s (Chrome/Firefox/IE) own list
of cipher-suite is displayed on the Qualys test when the
connection is proxied by OpenSense.
All other appliances use a hard-coded list of cipher suites
instead; only four offer cipher suites that exclude any weak
ciphers or hash algorithms. Eight of them offer 3DES, now
considered weak due its relatively small block size [30].
Two appliances offer the insecure DES cipher [44]. Five
appliances include the RC4 cipher, which has been shown
to have biases [45], and is no longer supported by any
modern browsers. Microsoft includes the deprecated MD5
hash algorithm [47]. Three appliances offer IDEA ciphers [31]
with a 64-bit block length. When relying on the DHE ciphers,
a reasonably secure modulus value should be used, e.g., 2048
or higher [27]. However, eleven appliances accept a 1024-
bit modulus; UserGate and Comodo even accept a 512-bit
modulus.
B. Certificate Validation Results
In this section, we discuss the vulnerabilities found in the
certificate validation mechanism of the tested TLS proxies; for
summary, see Tables III, IV and V.
WebTitan, UserGate and Comodo do not perform any
certificate validation; their TLS proxies allowed all our faulty
TLS certificates. UserGate enables TLS inspection by default
after a fresh installation. Endian does not perform certificate
validation by default (a checkbox for accepting all certificates
is checked by default). We uncheck the checkbox to test the
certificate validation mechanism in Endian, and discuss the
results based on the forced certificate validation. Comodo also
includes in its configuration interface a checkbox for accepting
all certificates, checked by default. Even after unchecking it,
the appliance still does not perform any certificate validation.
Both WebTitan and UserGate block access to the web
servers offering RSA-512 certificates, possibly triggered by
the TLS libraries utilized by the proxies, and not by the TLS
interception certificate validation code (as apparent from the
error messages we observed). Although Comodo accepts self-
signed certificates, Firefox caught the faulty certificate. This is
the result of Comodo mirroring the X.509 version 3 extension
‘basic constrains: CA’ value of the server self-signed certificate
to the client-side TLS connection. Note that Firefox blocks a
TLS connection when the delivered leaf certificate has the CA
flag set to true, while Chrome accepts it. We omit WebTitan,
UserGate and Comodo from the remaining discussion here, as
they do not perform any certificate validation.
UserGate and TrendMicro cache TLS certificates and ignore
changes in the server-side certificates (as opposed to modern
browsers). Therefore, we regenerate a key pair for their TLS
proxies for each of our certificate validation test, to ensure
accuracy (i.e., not the results of cached TLS certificates).
We mark a faulty certificate as passed when the TLS proxy
accepts the faulty certificate but leaves some chances for a
diligent client to catch the anomaly. This behavior results from
the way TLS proxies mirror X.509 extensions and their values
to the client-to-proxy connection. The parameters mirrored are
typically the common name, the keyUsage and extKeyUsage
extensions, and the not before and expiry dates. In addition,
Comodo mirrors the basic constraints CA flag, Cisco mirrors
the RSA key size when it is 1024 bits and lower, and Microsoft
mirrors the signature hashing algorithm. For simplicity, we
report our results using the Firefox browser, but some results
may change based on the client’s validation process. For
example, the Chrome browser allowed the leaf certificate with
the basic constraints CA flag set to true in the Comodo self-
signed test, while Firefox blocked access in this case.
Cacheguard accepts self-signed certificates (explicitly al-
lowed in its default configuration). Untangle and Cisco for-
ward the wrong CN certificates to our Firefox browser, which
caught it and blocked access. McAfee is the sole appliance
to accept a leaf certificate with an unknown x509 version 3
extension, marked as critical. Regarding malformed extension
values, only Cisco blocks the anomalous certificate; pfSense,
Cacheguard, OpenSense, and Endian pass it to the browser.
Only Microsoft, Cisco, and McAfee check the revocation sta-
tus of the offered certificates. When exposed to expired or not
yet valid leaf certificates, Cisco forwards the certificates to the
browser, as its default settings are configured to only monitor
expired leaf certificates, and not to drop the connections.
Untangle fails to detect expired or not yet valid root CA
certificates; Cisco disallows adding them to its trusted store in
the first place. Cisco fails to detect expired and not yet valid
intermediate certificates. Microsoft and McAfee allow leaf
certificates whose keyUsage do not include keyEnciphernment.
Untangle fails to detect root CA certificates that do not have
keyCertSign among the keyUsage values, and Cisco disallows
adding them to its trusted store. Similarly, Cisco disallows
adding root CA certificates whose extKeyUsage parameter is
codeSigning and RSA-512 root CA certificates to its store.
McAfee accepts leaf certificates whose extKeyUsage x509
version 3 parameter is set to clientAuth.
Sophos, Cacheguard, OpenSense, and Endian accept RSA-
512 leaf certificates (easily factorable [43]), and then issue
certificates with RSA-2048, leaving no options for browsers to
catch such certificates. Cisco also allows RSA-512 certificates,
but Firefox detects them, as Cisco’s proxy mirrors the RSA
key sizes of RSA-512 and RSA-1024 server certificates to
the client-to-proxy TLS connection (RSA-2048 and higher key
sizes are mapped to RSA-2048).
Microsoft mirrors signature hashing algorithms, and thus
passes weak and deprecated hash algorithms (if any) to the
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RESULTS FOR CERTIFICATE VALIDATION, PART I. 3 MEANS A FAULTY CERTIFICATE IS ACCEPTED AND CONVERTED TO A VALID CERTIFICATE BY THE
TLS PROXY; Ù MEANS A FAULTY CERTIFICATE IS ACCEPTED BY THE TLS PROXY BUT CAUGHT BY THE CLIENT BROWSER (FIREFOX); AND BLANK
MEANS CERTIFICATE BLOCKED. ENDIAN* DOES NOT HAVE CERTIFICATE VALIDATION ENABLED BY DEFAULT.
Self
Signed
Signature
Mismatch
Fake
Geo-
Trust
Wrong
CN
Unkn-
own
Issuer
Non-CA
Interm-
ediate
X509v1
Interm-
ediate
Invalid
pathLen-
Constraint
Bad
Name
Constraint
Intermediate
Unknown
Critical
X509v3
Extension
Malformed
Extension
Values
Untangle Ù 3 3
pfSense 3 Ù
WebTitan 3 3 3 Ù 3 3 3 3 3 3 Ù
Microsoft 3 3
UserGate 3 3 3 Ù 3 3 3 3 3 3 Ù
Cisco Ù 3
Sophos 3 3
TrendMicro 3 3
McAfee 3 3 3
Cacheguard 3 3 Ù
OpenSense 3 Ù
Comodo Ù 3 3 Ù 3 3 3 3 3 3 Ù
Endian* 3 Ù
TABLE IV
RESULTS FOR CERTIFICATE VALIDATION, PART II. FOR LEGEND, SEE TABLE III; N/A MEANS NOT TESTED AS THE APPLIANCE DISALLOWS ADDING THE
CORRESPONDING FAULTY CA CERTIFICATE TO ITS TRUSTED STORE.
Revoked ExpiredLeaf
Expired
Interm-
ediate
Expired
Root
Not Yet
Valid
Leaf
Not Yet
Valid
Interm-
ediate
Not Yet
Valid
Root
Leaf
keyUsage
w/out Key
Enciph-
erment
Root
keyUsage
w/out
KeyCert-
Sign
Leaf
extKey-
Usage w/
clientAuth
Root
extKey-
Usage
w/ Code
Signing
Untangle 3 3 3 3 3
pfSense 3 3
WebTitan 3 Ù 3 3 Ù 3 3 Ù 3 Ù 3
Microsoft 3 3
UserGate 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cisco Ù 3 N/A Ù 3 N/A N/A N/A
Sophos 3 3
TrendMicro 3 3
McAfee 3 3 3
Cacheguard 3 3
OpenSense 3 3
Comodo 3 Ù 3 3 Ù 3 3 Ù 3 Ù 3
Endian* 3 3
client. Cisco accepts certificates signed using the deprecated
MD4 algorithm. Microsoft, WebTitan, UserGate, and Comodo
fail to detect external leaf certificates signed by their own
root keys. Note that, when a TLS connection is terminated,
Untangle and Microsoft use a TLS handshake failure; pfSense,
Sophos, TrendMicro, McAfee, Cacheguard, OpenSense, and
Endian redirect the connection to an error page; and Cisco
uses an untrusted CA certificate, relying on the browser to
block the connection. However, error pages as displayed by
Sophos and TrendMicro, allow end-users to reestablish the
connection (Sophos through ‘Add exception for this URL’,
and TrendMicro through ‘Continue at own your risk’). This
behavior is a deviation from current practice (in browsers), as
the users may be unaware of the actual risks and consequences
if they bypass these warnings.
C. Trusted CA Stores
In this section, we analyze the results for trusted CA stores,
their accessibility, source, and content; see Table VI. Note that,
as WebTitan, UserGate, and Comodo perform no certificate
validations, their trusted stores are of no use.
Accessing the trusted stores. Untangle’s file system can
be accessed through SSH. We found that Untangle relies
on two CA trusted stores, saved in Java Keystore files on
the filesystem. The first store, ‘trusted-ca-list.jks’, holds the
CA authorities trusted by default, while the second store,
‘trustStore.jks’, holds the custom CA certificates, added by
the machine administrator through Untangle’s UI. pfSense
also allows SSH, and we found that its CA trusted store on
the FreeBSD filesystem under ‘ca-root-nss.crt’. pfSense does
not offer any UI to add custom CA certificates. We append
our crafted certificates to the original store, in a format that
includes the public key, in addition to the text meta-data
(OpenSSL’s ‘-text’ option). Microsoft relies on the Windows
Server’s standard trusted store. To view the content of the
trusted store and to inject our crafted CA certificates, we rely
on the Microsoft Management Console, in the Trusted Root
Certification Authorities section of the Local Computer.
Cisco’s trusted CA store can be accessed through the appli-
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RESULTS FOR CERTIFICATE VALIDATION, PART III. FOR LEGEND, SEE TABLE III.
Root Key
Length
(Good Leaf)
Leaf Key
Length
(Good Root)
Signature Hashing
Algorithm
DHE
Modulus
Length
Own
Root
512 1024 512 768 1016 1024 MD4 MD5 SHA1 512 1024
Untangle 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
pfSense 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
WebTitan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Microsoft 3 3 Ù Ù Ù 3 3
UserGate 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cisco N/A 3 Ù 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sophos 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TrendMicro 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
McAfee 3 3
Cacheguard 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
OpenSense 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Comodo 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Endian* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
ance’s web interface, under the Cisco Trusted Root Certificate
List. It also includes another interface, the Cisco Blocked
Certificates, for untrusted issuer certificates. To add custom
CA certificates, the appliance includes a third interface, the
Custom Trusted Root Certificates. However, Cisco does not
allow the injection of most of our invalid root certificates, and
responds with an error when tried. Sophos allows accessing
the trusted CA store through its web interface, under Global
Verification CAs. The interface allows adding custom root
certificates, in addition to disabling CA certificates that are in-
cluded by default. TrendMicro’s trusted store can be accessed
through the web interface’s Active Certificates section. It is
possible to add custom CA certificates and deactivate existing
default ones. McAfee gives access to the root certificates
supplied by default in the Known CAs section, and allows
adding custom root certificates in the My CAs section.
Cacheguard’s web interface does not include a section for
root CA certificates. In addition, Cacheguard does not give
access to its filesystem through a terminal, and does not
support SSH. We thus mount the appliance’s virtual hard
disk to a Linux machine, and locate the trusted store in a
‘ca-bundle.crt’ file. We subsequently append our custom CA
certificates to the bundle. Similarly, OpenSense and Endian
do not include a section for root certificates. However, they
give access to the filesystem through an OS shell terminal.
We locate the trusted store of OpenSense in a ‘cert.pem’
bundle file, and Endian’s in a ‘ca-certificates.crt’ bundle file.
We include our custom CA certificates to these files.
Source and content. As documented on Untangle’s SSL
Insepctor wiki page [23], the list of trusted certificates is
generated from the Debian/Linux ca-certificates package, in
addition to Mozilla’s root certificates. However, Untangle
includes Microsoft’s own Root Agency certificate, indicating
the additional inclusion of Windows trusted certificates. The
Root Agency certificate is RSA-512 that can be trivially
compromised (see Section VII). Untangle also includes 21
RSA-1024 root certificates, 30 expired certificates, and 16
certificates from issuers that are no longer trusted by major
browser/OS vendors (three from CNNIC CA, six DigiNotar,
three TU¨RKTRUST, and four WoSign certificates).
pfSense’s trusted CA store relies on Mozilla’s NSS cer-
tificates bundle, extracted from the nss-3.30.2 version (Apr.
2017), with 20 untrusted certificates omitted from the bundle,
as specified in the header of the trusted store. It does not
include any RSA-512 or RSA-1024 certificates, and no ex-
pired certificates. However, pfSense includes two CNNIC CA
certificates, and four WoSign CA certificates.
Similar to the other Windows OSes, the Windows Server
2008 R2 also does not display the full list of trusted root cer-
tificates in its management console, and instead, only displays
the root certificates of web servers already visited. We thus
rely on the Microsoft Trusted Root Certificate Program [15]
to collect the list of certificates trusted to the date of the
testing. We found that the list includes two CNNIC CA
certificates, two TU¨RKTRUST CA certificates, two ANSSI
CA certificates, and four WoSign CA certificates. Nonetheless,
the acquired list does not include the RSA key sizes of the
certificates, their expiry dates, or their revocation states.
As for Cisco, we found four problematic root CA certificates
from TU¨RKTRUST included into the trusted store. However,
the RSA key sizes are not displayed within the UI, so we
could not check for RSA-512 and RSA-1024 CA certificates.
Sophos includes two CNNIC, four WoSign, and three
TU¨RKTRUST CA certificates; TrendMicro has a CNNIC,
two TU¨RKTRUST, and 30 expired certificates; and McAfee
includes a CNNIC certificate. The RSA key sizes (for all three)
and expiry dates (for Sophos and McAfee) of CA certificates
are not displayed within their UI, and thus we could not check
for these issues.
Cacheguard’s trusted store is extracted from Mozilla NSS’s
root certificates file ‘certdata.txt’ [17] and converted using
Curl’s ‘mk-ca-bundle.pl’ version 1.27 script [3], as specified
in the ‘ca-bundle.crt’ trusted store file. We parse the trusted
store using OpenSSL’s ‘-text’ option to extract the certificate
metadata. The trusted store contains two TU¨RKTRUST, four
WoSign, three expired certificates; however, it is free of RSA-
512 or RSA-1024 certificates. OpenSense’s store also relies on
Mozilla, extracted from the nss-3.35 (Jan. 2018) version, with
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TABLE VI
RESULTS FOR TRUSTED STORES, PRIVATE KEYS AND INITIAL SETUP. ‘N/A’: NOT AVAILABLE (FAILED TO LOCATE THE PRIVATE KEY ON DISK); ‘NOT
APPLICABLE’: THE APPLIANCE DOES NOT RELY ON ANY STORE (NO CERTIFICATE VALIDATION); ‘WORLD’: READABLE BY ANY USER ACCOUNT ON THE
APPLIANCE.
Trusted CA Store Private Key Initial Behavior
Location Type Location State Read Permission InspectionBy Default
Pre-Generated
Key Pair
Untangle /usr/share/untangle/lib/ssl-inspector/trusted-ca-list.jks
Java
Key Store
/usr/share/untangle
/settings/untangle-
certificates/untangle.key Plaintext Root Off No
pfSense /usr/local/share/certs/ca-root-nss.crt
Mozilla
NSS
/usr/local/etc
/squid/serverkey.pem Plaintext World Off No
WebTitan Not Applicable None /usr/blocker/ssl/ssl cert/webtitan.pem Plaintext World Off No
Microsoft mmc.exe → Windows TrustedStore → Local Computer
Microsoft
Store
CERT SYSTEM STORE
LOCAL MACHINE MY
Exportable
Key Admin Off No
UserGate Not Applicable None /opt/entensys/webfilter/etc/private.pem Plaintext World On No
Cisco
Network → Certificate
Management → Cisco
Trusted Root Certificate List
GUI N/A N/A N/A Off No
Sophos
Web Protection → Filtering
Options → HTTPS CAs →
Global Verification CAs
GUI N/A N/A Admin (forGUI download) Off No
TrendMicro
HTTP → Configuration →
Digital Certificates →
Active Certificates
GUI /var/iwss/https/certstore/https ca/default key.cer
Passphrase
Encryption World Off Yes
McAfee
Policy → Lists →
Subscribed Lists → Certificate
Authorities → Known CAs
GUI N/A N/A Admin (forGUI download) Off Yes
Cacheguard /usr/local/proxy/var/ca-ssl/ca-bundle.crt
Mozilla
NSS
/usr/local/proxy/var
/ca-ssl/self-ca.key Plaintext World Off Yes
OpenSense /usr/local/openssl/cert.pem MozillaNSS /var/squid/ssl/ca.pem Plaintext Root Off No
Comodo Not Applicable None /var/cni/credentials/ca.key Plaintext World Off No
Endian /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
‘update-ca-
certificates’
Command
/var/efw/proxy/https cert Plaintext World Off No
two untrusted certificates omitted from the bundle, as specified
in the header of the NSS trusted store. It does not include any
RSA-512 or RSA-1024 certificates, and no expired certificates.
However, it includes a TU¨RKTRUST CA certificate.
Endian’s trusted CA store bundle is the output of the
‘update-ca-certificates’ Debian Linux command [24]. The
trusted store contains two CNNIC, three TU¨RKTRUST, four
WoSign, 10 expired, and 11 RSA-1024 CA certificates.
D. Private Key Protection
In this section, we discuss the results regarding the TLS
proxies’ private keys, in terms of storage location, state, and
the privilege required to access them; see Table VI.
We could not access the filesystem of Cisco’s AsyncOS to
locate its private key on disk. Instead, we extract the key from
memory using Heartleech [9] (see [46, Appendix B]). Sophos
and McAfee provide access to their filesystems through a
bash terminal. However, we could not locate their private keys
on disk. Sophos stores the key in a database, as it can be
recovered by invoking the following command ‘cc get object
REF CaSigProxyCa’ via Sophos’ terminal. McAfee possibly
has its private key hard-coded, as its key pair is pre-generated,
as discussed later in this section. Thus, we could not locate
the private key on disk. We get a copy of their respective
private keys by downloading them from the appliances’ web
interfaces. As there is no information on the private key on
disk, and the located key was used only for testing external
content signed by own key, we do not discuss these appliances
in the rest of the section.
We rely on the methodologies from Section IV-B to access
the filesystems on non-Windows appliances. pfSense and Un-
tangle provide SSH access. For WebTitan and Cacheguard, we
mount their respective virtual disk disks on a separate machine.
UserGate, TrendMicro, OpenSense, Comodo, and Endian pro-
vide access to their OS shell terminal by default. Untangle,
pfSense, WebTitan, UserGate, Cacheguard, OpenSense, Co-
modo and Endian store their plaintext private keys within
12
their filesystems (as ‘untangle.key’, ‘serverkey.pem’, ‘webti-
tan.pem’, ‘private.pem’, ‘self-ca.key’, ‘ca.pem’, ‘ca.key’, and
‘https cert’ files, respectively). pfSense, WebTitan, UserGate,
Cacheguard, Comodo, and Endian allow read access to all
users accounts (write is restricted to root), while Untangle and
OpenSense allow read/write only to root accounts.
Regarding TrendMicro, we get access to the filesystem using
its OS terminal, and locate the root private key in a file named
‘default key’, with read permission to all user accounts (write
is restricted to root). However, the located key is encrypted
using a passphrase. We brute-force the encrypted key using a
python script and a dictionary of common English words, and
successfully decrypt the key, with the passphrase ‘trend’.
Microsoft’s private key is stored using the Windows Soft-
ware Key Storage Provider, utilizing Cryptography API: Next
Generation (CNG). The key is exportable through the Mi-
crosoft Management Console, if opened with SYSTEM privi-
leges. We rely on the Mimikatz tool to export the key, which
requires a less privileged Administrator account.
We install multiple instances of each appliance to check
if the root certificates are pre-generated. To our surprise, we
found that TrendMicro, McAfee and Cacheguard use such
certificates to intercept the TLS traffic. McAfee includes an
X509v3 ‘Netscape Certificate Comment’ extension, with the
following warning: “This is the default McAfee root CA.
It will be delivered with each web gateway installation. We
recommend to generate and use your own CA.”. However, it
does not provide any warning during installation/configuration.
Although Cacheguard’s documentation explicitly state: “the
default system CA certificate is generated during the instal-
lation” [2], in reality, it uses a pre-generated certificate.
VI. EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTS BETWEEN 2016–2018
In this section, we highlight the evolution of the overlapping
appliances that were tested in three separate instances between
2016 to 2018: by Durumeric et al. [36] in 2016 (disclosed to
vendors in Sept. 2016), our own tests in 2017 [46] (disclosed
in Dec. 2017), and the latest product releases tested in 2018
as part of this paper (disclosed in May 2018).
In 2016, Untangle included RC4 and weak ciphers in its
cipher-suite; we found that version 13.0 (2017) still included
weak ciphers, but no RC4. The Untangle 13.2 release, tested
in 2018, has no differences in its TLS interception processes
compared to release 13.0, and thus, shows the exact same
results. pfSense, which was not tested in 2016 by Durumeric
et al., accepts the TLS version 1.1 in its 2.3.4 release (2017),
while pfSense 2.4.2-P1 (2018) no longer does. Moreover,
pfSense 2.3.4 maps the certificate keys to RSA-4096, while the
latest version maps them to RSA-2048. In 2016, WebTitan had
a broken certificate validation process and offered RC4 and
modern ciphers; we found that WebTitan version 5.15 (2017)
did not perform any certificate validation, was vulnerable to
the CRIME attack, and still offered RC4, in addition to weak
ciphers. Moreover, the latest version of WebTitan (5.16) in
2018 accepts SSLv3 (did not in 2017), but is now patched
against CRIME. Microsoft performed no certificate validation
in 2016 and the highest supported SSL/TLS version was
SSLv2.0; it now (2018) performs certificate validation, and
supports SSL versions 2.0, 3.0 and TLS 1.0. The Microsoft
and UserGate product releases are the same in 2018 compared
to 2017. Cisco no longer offers RC4 and export-grade ciphers,
which was reported in 2016. Furthermore, Cisco build 270’s
CBC ciphers (2017) are not recognized by the Qualys client
test, while the latest build’s CBC ciphers (2018) are, indicating
that the appliance is vulnerable to the BEAST attack. The older
build fails to block RSA certificates with malformed extension
values, while the latest build does. The latest build fails to
block expired and not yet valid intermediate root certificates,
in addition to RSA-512 leaf certificates, while the older build
(270) blocks them successfully. In 2016, Sophos offered RC4,
but not in the 2018 release.
We contacted the six affected companies after our 2017
tests, and received replies from three companies; Untangle
replied with just an automatic reply, Entensys confirmed that
they have passed the matter to its research team. Netgate
(pfSense), stated that they philosophically oppose TLS inter-
ception, but include it as it is a commonly requested feature.
Netgate also states that the TLS interception is done using the
external package ‘Squid’, which it does not control completely.
They claimed that our tested version was five releases old at
that time. We found the latest version to have the exact same
results, with two minor exceptions. We are also contacting all
vendors from our latest 2018 tests.
Overall, the disclosures appear to have limited impact
on vendors. Many vendors completely ignored the security
issues (Untangle, Microsoft, UserGate, and pfSense). More
worryingly, some products even became worse over time
(Cisco), and some patched product releases introduced new
vulnerabilities compared to their older versions (WebTitan).
VII. PRACTICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we summarize how the vulnerabilities re-
ported could be exploited by an attacker.
MITM attacks can be trivially launched to impersonate
any web server against clients behind UserGate, WebTitan,
Comodo and Endian, due to their lack of certificate validation
(using default configuration). Attackers can simply use a self-
signed certificate for any desired domain, fooling even the
most secure and up-to-date browsers behind these appliances.
Since Usergate enables TLS interception by default, users
located behind a freshly installed UserGate appliance are
automatically vulnerable. Likewise, clients behind Cacheguard
are vulnerable, as the appliance’s TLS proxy accepts self-
signed certificates. Clients behind Untangle are also similarly
vulnerable, due to the RSA-512 ‘Root Agency’ certificate in
its trusted store. This Root Agency CA certificate, which is
valid until 2039, has been used since the 1990s as the default
test certificate for code signing and development; Windows
systems still include this certificate, but mark it as untrusted.
The RSA-512 private key corresponding to this certificate can
be easily factored under four hours [43] as a one-time effort,
and the factored key could be used attack all instances of
Untangle.
An attacker can also launch MITM attacks to decrypt traffic
or impersonate any web server against clients behind Trend-
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Micro, McAfee and Cacheguard, as they rely on pre-generated
root keys (identical on all installations). The attacker can
retrieve private keys for these appliances from her own instal-
lations irrespective of privileges required to access the keys.
UserGate, WebTitan, Microsoft, and Comodo accept exter-
nal certificates signed by their own root keys. If an attacker
can gain access to the private keys of these appliances, she
can launch MITM attacks to impersonate any web server.
UserGate, WebTitan and Comodo provide ‘read’ privileges to
non-root users for the private key, while Microsoft mandates
admin privileges.
When combined with a Java applet to bypass the same origin
policy, the BEAST vulnerability [34] may allow an attacker
to recover authentication cookies from the clients behind
Microsoft, Cisco and TrendMicro. Attackers could also recover
cookies from clients behind WebTitan, Microsoft, TrendMicro,
Comodo, and Endian due to their use of RC4 [45].
Attackers could break session confidentiality for clients
behind Sophos, Cacheguard, OpenSense, Comodo and Endian,
as they accept RSA-512 external leaf certificates (RSA-512 is
easily factored). Note that, in 2016, 1% of TLS web servers
were found to host an RSA-512 certificate [43]. In contrast,
modern browsers will refuse to establish such connections.
All appliances except Untangle and McAfee accept certifi-
cates signed using MD5, with WebTitan, Microsoft, UserGate,
Cisco and Comodo also accept MD4. Weak collision resistance
of MD5/MD4 [47] can be exploited in a practical attack
scenario, where the attacker forges a rogue intermediate CA
certificate that appears to be signed by a valid trusted root
CA; all leaf certificates signed by this rogue CA will similarly
be trusted by the appliances. As a result of this one-time
effort, the holder of this rogue intermediate CA can launch
MITM attacks and impersonate web servers, targeting the
users behind all the appliances that accept certificates signed
using MD5 [42].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We present a framework for analyzing TLS interception
behaviors of network appliances to uncover potential vul-
nerabilities introduced by them. We tested thirteen network
appliances, and found that all their TLS proxies are vulnerable
against the tests under our framework—at varying levels. Each
proxy lacks at least one of the best practices in terms of
protocol and parameters mapping, patching against known
attacks, certificate validation, CA trusted store maintenance,
and private key protection. We found that the clients behind the
thirteen appliances are vulnerable to full server impersonation
under an active MITM attack, of which one enables TLS
interception by default. We also found that three TLS proxies
rely on pre-generated root keys, allowing trivial MITM attacks.
While TLS proxies are mainly deployed in enterprise envi-
ronments to decrypt the traffic in order to scan for malware and
network attacks, they introduce new intrusion opportunities
and vulnerabilities for attackers. As TLS proxies act as the
client for the proxy-to-web server connections, they should
maintain (at least) the same level of security as modern
browsers; similarly, as they act as a TLS server for the client-
to-proxy connections, they should be securely configured like
any up-to-date HTTPS server, by default. Before enabling TLS
interception, concerned administrators may use our framework
to evaluate their network appliances, and weigh the potential
vulnerabilities that may be introduced by a TLS proxy against
its perceived benefits.
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